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Abstract 
This paper looks at the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as an important 
part of the international trade law system and explores if and how it affects the steering 
capacity of a nation state regarding higher education. It offers a new conceptual 
framework to look on the impact of GATS on higher education within its increasingly 
complex environment by distinguishing between the 'static' dimension (GATS' rules and 
disciplines) and the 'dynamic' dimension (stakeholders' standpoints, views and actions). 
Furthermore, by comparing two case studies conducted in the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands, it connects the theoretical framework on GATS and the steering capacity of 
a nation state with specific national conditions and complements case studies that have 
been so far carried out in other countries. We concluded that neither through the static 
dimension nor through the dynamic, was the steering capacity in the two cases affected 
directly: nation states remain the prime actors regarding higher education. Nevertheless, 
exercising their power over higher education has become more complex and nation states 
must take more consequences of their internal policy choices into account, which may be 
difficult to predict. 
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Introduction  
Building on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which has been in 
existence since 1947, the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was signed on 15 April 1994 together with the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP). In this 
large movement towards liberalization of world trade, along with a range of service 
sectors (business services, communication services, financial services, etc.), educational 
services were also selected for further liberalization and regulation.  
 
The fact that educational services were included in GATS met with strong opposition 
amongst various stakeholders. The appropriateness and correctness of such a step has 
been repeatedly put under scrutiny. Very strong criticism emerged especially from labor 
unions in public services, teacher’s unions, student associations and civic movements 
(see for example AUCC, 2001; Education International, 2000; ESIB, 2001; EUA, 2001; 
Public Services International, 2000). The discussion about the impact of GATS on 
education and educational policy intensified mainly during the renegotiation round 
launched in November 2001 in Doha, where the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was 
held. During the debate a significant disagreement appeared about higher education’s 
inclusion in GATS as well as very contrasting assessments of GATS’ impact on higher 
education on both global and national levels. Some authors claimed during the debate that 
if implemented GATS might, or would, severely limit the nation state’s capacity to steer 
higher education (see for example Cohen, 2000; Schugurensky & Davidson-Harden, 
2003; Worth, 2000; etc.).   
This article is based on a study by Vlk (2006) exploring the relationship between the 
international trade law system and the steering capacity of a nation state in relation to 
higher education. In general, the study was meant to contribute to the on-going discussion 
about the impact of globalization in higher education as well as to the debate about the 
role of a nation state in its increasingly complex environment. Furthermore, Vlk’s study 
suggested a new conceptual framework for looking at the ‘static’ dimension (GATS’ 
rules and disciplines) and the ‘dynamic’ dimension (stakeholders’ standpoints, views and 
actions), as through both channels potentially the steering capacity of a nation state in 
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higher education might be influenced, as we will explain in the section ‘Globalization and 
institutions’. Finally, by comparing two case studies conducted in the Czech Republic 
and the Netherlands, it made an attempt to connect the theoretical framework on GATS 
and the steering capacity of a nation state with specific national conditions and to 
complement case studies carried out in other countries.   
 
The Czech Republic and the Netherlands were selected as suitable countries for 
conducting case studies mainly for the following reasons. As a necessary condition, each 
country was either a collective or an individual member of the WTO at the time of its 
foundation, and both signed up to open up negotiations on GATS in 1994. At the same 
time, the Czech Republic represents a new EU member state that negotiated the 1994 
commitments on its own, whereas the Netherlands is an old member state. The choice 
was made that one case study should be conducted in an ‘old’ EU member state, mainly 
to look at the complication of having both the European Commission and the EU member 
states jointly competent to conclude GATS in 1994. In this case, the Commission 
negotiates on behalf of its member states under the World Trade Organization even when 
it comes to higher education services. An unprecedented status is associated with a 
number of new EU member states. Those acceding to the EU in the middle of 2004 
already had made their individual commitments under GATS in 1994. Since their 
entrance to the EU, they were officially included in the EU negotiation mechanism.  
 
Other factors were also taken into consideration when choosing these two countries. The 
Czech Republic is an example of a Central and Eastern European country that left a 
centralized communist regime after 1989 and that radically changed the whole political 
system. This change has been reflected in all policy areas including higher education. The 
changes that were experienced by Western European systems gradually and over several 
decades have been implemented in Central and Eastern European countries at a 
considerably higher pace, within a much shorter period. The Netherlands, on the other 
hand, represents a stable democratic country in Western Europe.   
 
Another reason for our country selection was the accessibility of data, persons, legal 
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materials as well as sufficient knowledge of each system. In this respect the language 
issue was taken into account as well as existing materials that could be used for study.  
 
Before approaching our main question, we will first devote a few paragraphs to GATS 
and its main principles. Then, in the third section, we turn to outlining the literature on, 
first, globalization and the nation state’s steering capacity, second, on models of how 
nation states steer higher education, and finally on the impact of GATS on higher 
education. This all leads to the model of analysis, which we outline after that. The 
analysis of the two country cases using that model makes up the bulk of our contribution. 
We then discuss what can be learnt from these two cases about the impact of GATS on 
nation states’ steering capacity regarding higher education. A postscript on higher 
education in the Doha round was added to round off this article. 
 
WTO, GATT and GATS  
The WTO is the principal intergovernmental organization for international trade. It was 
built extensively on its ‘predecessor’, GATT, which was created in 1947. GATT had 
gradually developed into a specialized agency, yet without having the status of an 
international organization (Schermers & Blokker, 2001). The main goal of GATT was to 
reduce customs tariffs and other impediments to trade, as they constituted substantial 
barriers to further economic growth. 
 
Since 1947, GATT oversaw eight successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
which culminated in the Uruguay Round. Taking place between 1986 and 1994, the 
Uruguay Round represented the biggest ever negotiating mandate on trade. The result 
was ultimately 60 agreements and decisions on more than 500 pages. It was also 
substantial in economic terms: the world was estimated to gain about $ 96 billion from 
the results of the round. Yet the developed countries and regions, such as the United 
States, Japan and the EU, were expected to benefit most (Harrison, Rutherford & Tarr, 
1997; Stiglitz, 2006).  
 
The WTO was established in 1994 and GATS, as already mentioned in the introduction, 
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entered into force on 1 January 1995. The main objective of GATS remains the same as it 
had been for GATT – progressive trade liberalization should be achieved through 
subsequent rounds of negotiations. During these negotiations the WTO member states are 
expected to take on various levels of obligations to reduce barriers in respective service 
sectors. As a result of the Uruguay Round, GATS was structured to represent a 
framework under which liberalization could be pursued in the future with explicit 
commitments (Hoekman, 2000). Among other things, GATS is supposed to provide a 
higher level of security to traders and investors (Stiglitz, 2006).  
 
GATS consists of three interrelated parts. The first is the Agreement itself, which is often 
referred to as the Framework Agreement. It contains the rules applicable to all WTO 
member states; they are automatically parties to GATS. The second part consists of the 
sectoral annexes dealing with issues that are unique to particular economic sectors 
(movement of natural persons, air transport services, financial services, maritime 
transport services and telecommunications). The third part is the national Schedules of 
Specific Commitments.   
 
The Framework Agreement is subdivided into six parts. These parts deal with I) scope 
and definition, II) general obligations and disciplines, III) specific commitments, IV) 
progressive liberalization, V) institutional provisions, and VI) final provisions. General 
obligations and disciplines apply to all measures affecting trade in services. Specific 
commitments apply only to specific service sectors  and sub-sectors listed in member 
states’ schedules.     
 
Trade in services under GATS is defined by four modes of supply. The agreement 
distinguishes supply of service a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of 
any other Member (cross-border supply; mode 1), b) in the territory of one Member to 
the service consumer of any other Member (consumption abroad; mode 2), c) by a 
service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any 
other Member (commercial presence; mode 3), d) by a service supplier of one Member, 
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member 
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(presence of natural persons; mode 4).   
 
Two of GATS’ general obligations apply to all WTO member states – these are the most-
favored-nation treatment (MFN) and transparency. MFN is GATS requirement that its 
member states accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service providers 
of other members treatment that is no less favorable than that it accords to like services 
and service suppliers of any other state. Transparency refers to the GATS requirement 
that its member states publish their regulations affecting trade in services, that they notify 
the Council for Trade in Services of any relevant changes, and that they respond 
promptly to requests for information from other members.    
 
Market access and national treatment form specific commitments of GATS. Market 
access is defined in the GATS treaty as the requirement that a WTO Member State 
accord to services and service suppliers of other member states treatment not less 
favorable than that listed in its GATS schedule. National treatment is a GATS 
requirement that a WTO member state accord to services and service suppliers of other 
member states treatment no less favorable than what the member grants its own like 
services and service suppliers.  
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, each WTO member state tabled a Schedule of Specific 
Commitments containing horizontal commitments and sector-specific commitments. For 
each sector or sub-sector, limitations on market access and on national treatment were 
stated across modes of supply. During the Doha Round, which as we mentioned started 
with the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, the results of the 
Uruguay Round were renegotiated.  
 
GATS in particular has been intensively criticized. It has been claimed that it was 
designed to facilitate international business at the expense of democratic governance; a 
business agenda promoted by international corporations which was in constant tension 
with democratic principles and priorities embraced by the global citizenry. Furthermore, 
as the agreement is not confined to cross-border trade, it is said to invade many domestic 
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policies such as environment, culture, natural resources, health care, social services, 
and—most relevant for our article—education (see for example Sinclair, 2000a; Stiglitz, 
2006).     
 
Globalization and the nation state 
From our perspective, the WTO multilateral trading system (including GATS) is a 
significant part of the globalization process. In our view GATS and the negotiations 
between WTO members constitute an important part of what can be called the economic 
and political dimension of globalization (McBurnie, 2001). At the same time, we agree 
with Robertson, Bonal & Dale (2002) that “globalization is the outcome of processes that 
involve real actors—economic and political—with real interests” (p. 472). The view of 
globalization used in the study is what Castells (2000b) relates to global economy. In his 
view the global economy is able to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale. It is 
supported by the new infrastructure of information and communication technologies and 
it has been accelerated by deregulation and liberalization policies of national 
governments and international institutions. However, according to Castells, the global 
economy has been shaped not only by technologies and businesses but also by 
governments of the richest countries and international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). At the same time, deregulation of domestic economies, liberalization of 
international trade and investment, and privatization of public companies have been the 
major policies, implemented by national governments and advocated by the kinds of 
international organizations mentioned above, that have been the most important processes 
at the heart of globalization. GATS, as an agreement under the WTO, is perceived as one 
specific materialization of such a concept of globalization.    
 
In the 1990s the rules and the institutions of globalization were set up either directly 
through individual governments or through the policies imposed on them by the IMF, the 
World Bank, or the WTO. Castells sees the U.S. government as the main ‘globalizer’, 
and the other governments have followed the trend for deregulation, liberalization and 
privatization for various reasons. These include a demonstrative break with the 
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communist past in the case of Central and Eastern European countries and the crisis of 
legitimacy of welfarism and government control during the 1980s in Western Europe. 
What can be seen nowadays as a result of globalization is, according to Castells, a global 
economy as a network of interconnected parts of economies determining to a large extent 
the economy of each country (Castells, 2000b).  While we have higher education as our 
subject, our approach focuses on the broadly-defined economic dimension of 
globalization, the process enabling markets to operate internationally partly as a result of 
improved communication and regulation. 
 
Now, let us turn to the nation state. Regarding the rule of a modern nation state, we 
assume that it changes over time. For instance, Atkinson and Coleman (1992) highlight 
that, mainly as a consequence of the implementation of new macro-economic 
instruments, many areas of governance have grown in size and complexity. At the same 
time, political authorities have not been able to embrace all main sectors of public policy 
(Wallace & Wallace, 2000). As a result, the modern nation state must, on the one hand, 
maintain a certain level of control over public affairs, and on the other it must share the 
exercise of public authority with other organized groups (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992).   
 
In our view, the nation state represents a sovereign entity that exercises fundamental 
powers over its territory and inhabitants. However, intergovernmental, supranational, and 
non-governmental organizations, as well as other organized groups on both international 
and national levels, have been increasingly influencing the way the nation state maintains 
its control over public affairs. In the context of this article, the modern nation state is a 
traditional European state, based on either Roman tradition such as France or Germany or 
on Saxon tradition, as is the example of the United Kingdom (for more details see for 
example Neave, 2001). At the same time, it has been increasingly influenced by 
processes of regionalization in the form of European integration, in this case the 
institutionalized cooperation of European states through the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euroatom, 1957), and the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) (Urwin, 1995). 
Furthermore the Single European Act (1986), the treaties of Maastricht (1993), 
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Amsterdam (1999) and Nice (2000) set up the basis for intensive intergovernmental and 
supranational decision making in a whole range of policy areas (Holzhacker & 
Haverland, 2006).  
 
Steering in higher education        
Moving a step closer to our main issue, viz. that GATS is viewed as a potentially 
undermining the steering capacity of the nation state, this section spells out the concept of 
steering in the higher education sector in more detail. 
The concept of government steering in higher education is characterized as government 
trying to influence the decisions and actions of other actors according to its goals by 
using certain tools and instruments (Maassen & Van Vught, 1994; Jenniskens, 1997). 
Among the instruments, usually funding, regulation, planning and evaluation are 
distinguished (Huisman, Maassen & Neave, 2001). Westerheijden (1998) highlights 
quality assessment as a new steering instrument appeared in the 1980s.  
 
In the context of higher education, Maassen and Van Vught (1994) presented two models 
of government steering: the state control model and the state supervising model. The 
policy instruments in steering higher education are mainly instruments of funding and of 
authority. A similar conceptual framework was used to identify the relationship between 
the model of governance and the changes taking place in higher education systems in at 
least two dozen countries all over Western Europe as well as in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America (see Neave & Van Vught, 1991, 1994). In order to increase the explanatory 
value of the model of state steering, the dichotomy of the state control model and the 
state supervising model was replaced by a more refined alternative. Gornitzka and 
Maassen (2000) used Olsen’s (1988) typology to reflect different democratic ideas and 
views on the role of the state, societal actors and government agencies. Their four 
steering models are: the sovereign state, the institutional state, the corporate-pluralist 
state, and the classical liberal state (state supermarket model). In the sovereign state 
steering model, higher education is seen as a governmental instrument for reaching 
political, economical and social goals. The role of higher education is to implement the 
state’s higher education policy agenda. The institutional steering model refers to a 
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situation in which higher education institutions are given a special responsibility to 
protect academic values and traditions against political turbulences. The state usually 
does not interfere with academia. The corporate-pluralist state steering model assumes 
that there are several competing and legitimate centers of authority and control with 
respect to higher education. Finally, under the supermarket steering model the role of the 
state is minimal; it makes sure that the market mechanism in higher education is not 
distorted. Empirically, in selected West European countries (Gornitzka and Maassen 
(2000) identified a general tendency towards the supermarket steering model. However, 
no model was observed in its pure form. Rather, in most countries mixes of various 
steering models were observed, which they called a hybrid steering approach. This gives 
the framework in which we will analyze the steering capacity for our two case studies 
and to which we shall return explicitly at the end of the article.  
 
GATS and its impact in the existing literature  
How does GATS affect steering in higher education? This issue has been explored and 
studied by scholars, but has the issue been approached systematically? In general, GATS 
and its impact were discussed either on the national level or globally. The impact of 
GATS with respect to the United Kingdom was discussed by the AUT (2003), Nunn 
(2001), Rikowski (2003) and Worth (2000). Allport (2002), NTEU (2001), Ziguras, 
McBurnie and Reinke (2003a,2003b) focussed on Australia; AUCC (2001, 2003) focus 
on Canada; and the impact of GATS on South Africa was elaborated by CHE (2003) as 
well as Pillay, Maassen and Cloete (2003). Furthermore, Schugurensky and Davidson-
Harden (2003) studied potential implications of GATS for countries in Latin America and 
Ziguras (2003) compared four countries (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore and 
Malaysia). Mundy and Iga (2003) compared US and Japanese approaches to education 
services under GATS.  
 
The impact of GATS on the global level was examined for example by Altbach (2001), 
Barblan (2002), Cohen (2000), Hirsch (2002), Knight (2002, 2003), Larsen, Morris and 
Martin (2002), Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin (2002), OECD (2002), Robertson, Bonal and 
Dale (2002), Saner and Fasel (2003), Sauvé (2002), UN (2002), Van Damme (2002), 
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Vijlder (2002), Van der Wende (2002), and Ziguras (2002). Specific legal analyses were 
presented by Gottlieb and Pearson (2001) or Cottier, Breining-Kaufman and Kennett 
(2003) 
 
It appears from the published work that almost all elements of higher education systems 
are potentially impacted by GATS according to commentators. First of all it includes 
national higher education systems as a whole, mainly public sectors. At the same time 
individual higher education institutions are subject to influence (autonomy). Furthermore, 
individual students (access) and academics (employment, academic freedom) are also 
perceived as potentially affected. Although rarely found in the discussion of the impact of 
GATS, there are commentators attributing at least some positive effect to GATS; 
Schugurensky and Davidson-Harden (2003) admit that GATS might provide some 
potential advantages for the countries that decide to export educational services. Also, 
Mundy and Iga (2003) show that Japan used GATS to generate internal changes in 
Japanese higher education. Altbach (2001), along with Mundy and Iga, also argues that 
the USA stands to benefit significantly. Ziguras (2003) makes the same case for 
Australia. 
 
Finally, some authors attach to GATS rather limited or no impact on higher education. 
Sauvé (2002), for example, states that GATS does not have the potential that has been 
attributed to it by its main critics. As he stated it, GATS is not the driving force behind 
the explosive growth in international trade in educational services. Ziguras (2002) argues 
that GATS neither puts pressure on governments to fund public and private institutions 
equally, nor prevents them from implementing policies and regulatory measures to steer 
private sectors in order to achieve particular social and cultural objectives. Similarly, 
each country is free to decide nationally to what extent it will publicly finance higher 
education for its own citizens.  
 
With respect to the approaches and methods used, the studies discussing the impact of 
GATS on higher education vary immensely regarding their scope, focus, depth of 
analysis, descriptive tools, the way in which individual components of the main model 
12 
 
are connected, and the approach used to identify the impact itself. Many contributions 
contain very strong and resolute propositions, although the problems are only slightly 
tackled on the surface and not deeply analyzed. What is mostly absent is a solid link 
between GATS⎯its general rules and specific disciplines⎯and a particular national 
environment. A sufficient description of domestic conditions and an enumeration of 
relevant legal settings, which would allow to identify more precisely existing or potential 
collisions with major GATS principles, very often have been absent in the contributions 
so far, although a few contributions provide useful approaches in that respect (see 
Ziguras, 2003 or Ziguras, McBurnie and Reinke, 2003b).  
 
Selected analyses of GATS’ legal implications on higher education are rather modest in 
their conclusions and discuss various possibilities that might be under consideration. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the impact of GATS’ obligations differs across individual 
countries. It depends very much on the conditions in the particular national environment. 
This again shows that to assess the impact of GATS, a very detailed discussion is 
required of the national legal and public-policy conditions as well as the elaboration of 
mechanisms incorporating GATS commitments and general disciplines into the national 
legislation. The following section suggests a new perspective through which impacts of 
GATS on the nation state can be studied.   
     
Globalization and institutions – a new approach to look at GATS and the nation 
state  
Based on our conceptualization of globalization, we assume that globalization as such 
indeed exists and influences the institution of a modern nation state. The question is 
whether a regulatory framework to liberalise higher education reduces the regulatory 
power of states or whether nation states are still the main actors managing world 
problems on behalf on their societies (see for example Beck, 2000; Castells, 2000a or 
Strange, 1996 for the former and Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Cerny, 1997 or Clark, 1999 for 
the latter standpoint). We claim that although the nation state continues to be very 
powerful, some of its capacities have been changed or shifted and are nowadays shared 
with other players, such as international and supranational agencies. The relationship 
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between globalization and the nation state, however, is not a one-way projection. It must 
be seen as process of interaction. Nation states have shaped global forces, and those have 
in their turn influenced nation states.  
 
Once we accept that globalization has an impact on the nation state, the next question is 
how this happens. For this purpose we use the approach suggested by Djelic and Quack 
(2003): national institutions are vigorous and resistant; however, they change in time. 
Djelic and Quack “reinterpret globalization as contributing to that process of change – 
not destroying national institutions’ frames but rather pushing along their evolution and 
transformation” (p. 3). At the same time globalization for them is mainly about the ‘rules 
of the game’ and the negotiations and renegotiations of these rules. Inevitably, the 
processes of negotiation and renegotiation means change of existing rules and emergence 
of new rules at multiple scales.  
 
Djelic and Quack argue that globalization can be perceived as a process of institution 
building and institutional change, which is influenced by the interaction of various 
domestic and foreign actors. In terms of institutional change—which in fact means the 
adoption of transnational rules on the domestic level—Djelic and Quack distinguish 
trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories in the national societal space. The trickle-down 
trajectory is a top-down process with an indirect impact of transnational rules on the 
national level. As an example we can use the Lisbon convention on the recognition of 
qualifications concerning higher education in the European region as a binding 
international treaty affecting the way qualifications are recognized in a particular state. At 
the same time, the national setting can also be influenced in another way. A trickle-up 
trajectory appears when actors at the transnational level initiate (collective) action aimed 
to change the rules of the game. These changes may affect national actors who via 
bottom-up processes push through changes in the national setting. For instance, the 
European association of student unions initiated actions against incorporating higher 
education into the GATS, and its members, national student unions across Europe, 
undertook activities in their countries to influence the national governments.  
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The following figure demonstrates the two trajectories discussed above. It shows GATS 
commitments and general rules affecting the steering capacity of a nation state provided 
that they lead to changes in the national legislation on higher education. Another way in 
which the steering capacity of a nation state can be impacted is through stakeholders who 
initiate changes on the national level for which they may be influenced by stakeholders 
operating on a supranational or global level.  
 
Figure 1: Djelic and Quack’s framework applied to GATS 
 
Case studies 
The theoretical and conceptual considerations outlined above are now applied in our two 
case studies. Our case studies covered the period of 2000 until 2005. This period saw the 
apex of activity regarding GATS, in the negotiation halls, in publications, and on the 
streets.  
 
The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic was one of the WTO member states that made several commitments 
in higher education services already at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994. The 
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commitments were limited to privately funded higher education, although a private sector 
was not legally established until 1998 in the Czech Republic. Unlike in some countries, 
the GATS renegotiation process attracted almost no attention among either the general 
public or academia. Issues such as GATS in education or export of higher education did 
not appear in any strategic or policy document. Neither was it subject to any public 
debate. Only students participated through the international ESIB activities. However, no 
student activities were recorded in the Czech Republic.   
 
Why higher education’s inclusion into GATS was not perceived as an important issue in 
the Czech Republic can be explained by several factors. In general, higher education in 
the Czech Republic was a ‘self-sufficient’ system. It did not depend on either export or 
import. The number of students willing to pay for their education—both going to study 
abroad or attending institutions established by private providers in the Czech Republic—
was rather insignificant as the majority of Czech students preferred to obtain their 
academic training in public higher education institutions for free. At the same time, there 
was no governmental scholarship scheme supporting Czech students to obtain their 
degrees abroad.  
 
In general, no governmental policy was developed supporting higher education export or 
import. There were several reasons why Czech higher education did not have the capacity 
to attract a significant number of foreign students in the period studied. First, the 
institutions had not been able to meet student demand within the country and the 
resources to expand were rather limited. Second, high quality study programs taught in 
English were still lacking. Third, higher education was not perceived as a potential export 
commodity and further discussion was not stipulated by any other ministry (Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry and Trade, etc.) or by the 
general public.  
 
Also, the overall perception of higher education should be mentioned. After 1989 a 
massive privatization process took place in former Czechoslovakia as part of the political 
and economical transformation. As a result of right-wing government liberal policies, the 
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Czech economy became one of the most open in the world. Interestingly enough, higher 
education was left out of the liberalization scheme and developed as a highly autonomous 
system within the society. Supply and demand, investment approaches, student choice 
and other market-related categories were hardly applied or even deeply discussed in 
strategic ministerial materials such as the White Book on Education in 2001 or annually 
updated plans on development of higher education. The free provision of higher 
education by state and public institutions was considered part of the social system. The 
introduction of student fees faced strong opposition throughout the population. Although 
large private benefits of attaining higher education were documented in the Czech 
Republic too, it seemed that higher education was perceived mainly as a public good.   
 
These facts should be borne in mind when the impact of GATS on the Czech higher 
education system is discussed. Partly due to domestic political and social factors and 
partly due to the fact that Czech higher education has not been part of the ‘export-import 
business’, the feeling that foreign traditional or non-traditional providers could mean a 
potential threat to the ‘monopoly’ of public higher education institutions or to the quality 
of the system did not emerge. Therefore, a discussion on the renegotiation of higher 
education under GATS has not taken place in the Czech Republic in the period of study.  
 
From the studied documents and conducted interviews it appears that besides the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Industry and Trade no other stakeholders were 
involved in the GATS renegotiation. One additional commitment (rather insignificant) in 
mode 3 on national treatment was made by the Ministry of Education and added to the 
final schedule. For such a small change consultation with other players was not 
considered necessary. No actual process of negotiation between the Ministry and other 
stakeholders could be traced, neither in ministerial materials, nor was it mentioned during 
the interviews.  
 
With the exception of trade unions and students, stakeholders were not involved in any 
kind of activities related to liberalization of services within the WTO context on either 
the national or European (international) level. Students participated mainly through the 
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European organization of student unions (ESIB), although no activities were undertaken 
in the Czech Republic. The teachers’ trade union discussed liberalization of services in a 
broader perspective within the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUCE). Its 
representatives also participated during the demonstration against services liberalization 
in Brussels in March 2005.  
 
The Ministry of Education itself did not see any difficulties with foreign higher education 
institutions providing their services in the Czech Republic. It perceived competition in 
the marketplace as desirable, while any potential negative developments could be 
minimized by delivery of relevant information and a system of accreditation and mutual 
recognition. Competition from abroad was supported for similar reasons by the Chamber 
of Commerce as well as by private providers’ representatives. Trade unions were much 
more reserved with respect to this issue. They assumed that there was enough potential 
within domestic higher education institutions to meet the demand.  
 
The higher education legislation was neither modified due to commitments made in 1994 
nor to general obligations arising from GATS. All major changes in the higher education 
landscape, including the introduction of private providers in the market after 1998, were 
caused mainly by domestic developments and were partly initiated by the Bologna 
process. International developments such as liberalization of services, export and import 
of higher education, and related issues, were not relevant factors, neither in the legislation 
and decision-making process nor in policy implementation. No reference was made to 
GATS or to liberalization in general in any strategic ministerial or governmental 
document on higher education.  
 
Concerning current national legislation, it does not seem to be in conflict with any GATS 
provisions on the commercial presence mode. Any foreign provider seeking to establish a 
higher education institution in the Czech Republic has to meet the same conditions as a 
domestic service supplier.  
 
Decreasing the barriers for higher education providers, focusing on export, opening the 
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system to more institutions and other related issues did not rank among the priorities of 
the existing governmental higher education policy. It was mainly focused on finding a 
way to increase funding for the existing public institutions as a vehicle to improve the 
quality of the system. In general, higher education policy has been so far clustered almost 
exclusively around issues arising on the national level such as tuition fees, employability 
of graduates, quality assurance, and the implementation of the bachelor/master structure. 
Taking into account all the above mentioned features of the Czech system and the 
discussed developments, there is no particular reason why existing higher education 
providers or other stakeholders should have been disturbed by higher education being 
renegotiated under GATS.  
 
In sum, we can conclude that the way the Czech government steers higher education to 
date has been influenced more by other factors than by GATS or liberalization policy in 
general. The main driving forces behind the changes in the relationship between the state 
and higher education institutions after 1989 were decentralization and democratization of 
the system, and later also implementation of the Bologna process. These processes 
resulted in a very high level of autonomy and self-governance of higher education 
institutions. Changes in legislation and governmental measures in areas such as 
accreditation or funding were initiated by other rationales than general liberalization 
policies. GATS rules and the renegotiation round in particular played no role in higher 
education policy and therefore can be said to have had no impact on the steering capacity 
on the nation state in the Czech Republic till 2005.       
 
The Netherlands 
The GATS renegotiation process was given considerable attention in the Netherlands, 
although the discussion started later than in e.g. Australia or Canada. The range of 
stakeholders participating in the whole process was fairly large, and many were active not 
only vis-à-vis the others but also within their own constituencies. The students seemed to 
be the most vocal and the most critical participants during the debate.     
 
GATS and its potential consequences seem to be important to the Dutch higher education 
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system for two reasons. The first is an increasing effort of the Netherlands’ government 
and (some) higher education institutions to make the national higher education system 
more attractive for foreign students both by attracting students to the Netherlands and by 
positioning Dutch higher education institutions abroad as higher education providers. The 
second reason why GATS was taken seriously in the Dutch environment was uncertainty 
about GATS’ consequences for the existing Dutch funding system (with its traditionally 
already hybrid characteristics including private, mainly church-associated, higher 
education that existed since the late 19th century and that have been funded from the 
public purse since the early 20th century) as well as for the policy plans regarding 
introduction of an “Open Bestel” (“Open System”).    
 
The Open System policy illustrated the tendency to introduce more market-like 
mechanisms (i.e. liberalization and privatization) into higher education. The rationale of 
the Open System could be summarized as follows: a more market-like approach in higher 
education by allowing more competition between various providers in the system would 
lead to a more student-oriented (i.e. demand-driven) attitude of institutions, which would 
raise the quality of education. In such a system, (private) higher education institutions 
that until then did not receive any public funds would also become eligible if they met 
certain criteria. As the Open System was a controversial policy, it was introduced at first 
only by small-scale experiments, starting in 2007/2008. 
 
The parallel process of the GATS negotiations and the Open System experiments made 
the situation in Dutch higher education complicated on the one hand, and unique on the 
other, especially if one realizes the similarity of rationales behind both phenomena. 
Nevertheless, the link between the two processes was not always perceived. In many 
cases the discussion on GATS served as a lever for changes on the national level. Yet it 
was hard fully to explore and interpret the consequences of GATS’ principles for a 
possible mainstreaming of the Open System experiments over time.       
 
The GATS topic seemed to have been introduced to the Netherlands along two main 
lines. The first was represented by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA) which was 
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assigned, as in other countries, the role of a national negotiator and a coordinator in areas 
such as trade, trade in services, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), GATS, 
etc. There were standardized procedures in force in the Netherlands, such as the national 
Inter-ministerial Council for Trade Policy that had dealt with various issues since the 
existence of GATT. The MoEA was working on trade-related matters across all levels, 
including the WTO itself, the EU, as well as regular contacts with other Dutch ministries. 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the MoEA was the most involved and the best 
informed actor concerning GATS and associated topics. The Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science (MoECS), which is responsible for higher education policy, became 
involved in the whole debate on GATS much later – only after 2000 when the 
renegotiation (Doha) round started.  
 
The second line involves individuals or collective actors who obtained knowledge of 
GATS through various international channels. Due to their intensive participation on both 
European and international levels, some Dutch stakeholders quickly became familiar with 
the topic, and GATS started to appear in domestic speeches and discussions. It appeared 
first during the second half of the year 2001, after the issue had reached the public agenda 
in some other countries.  
 
International events and actions, such as the joint declaration of the university 
organizations EUA, AUCC, ACE and CHEA from September 2001, and the ESIB 
(European association of national student unions) newsletter on commodification from 
November 2001, were important sources of early information for Dutch actors. Meetings 
such as the OECD Forum in Washington in May 2002, the UNESCO Forum in Paris in 
October 2002, the OECD Forum in Trondheim (2003)—to name only a few—were 
actively visited or monitored by Dutch participants and helped them broaden their views. 
Most Dutch actors acknowledged that their first contact with the GATS debate was made 
by visiting international seminars and conferences, being informed by their foreign 
colleagues or reading the international press.  
 
Although some among the sixteen stakeholders and experts whom we interviewed said 
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that the discussion on the national level had not been not intensive enough, the issue was 
given considerable attention in various circles. The Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science invited selected representatives to a high level meeting to discuss GATS and 
related issues in October 2001. GATS and liberalization of higher education as a topic 
appeared in the Dutch press, such as the major newspaper NRC Handelsblad, and in the 
magazine Transfer issued by the Dutch international cooperation agency for higher 
education, NUFFIC. NUFFIC also organized a conference in March 2002 partly devoted 
to GATS. Noticeable too was a debate organized by the Dutch student union LSVb in 
Amsterdam in February 2003, again to mention only a few major events.   
 
GATS became a controversial topic on the Dutch higher education scene; for a short 
period it even topped the national agenda. GATS and its consequences for higher 
education were discussed within and between a number of institutional actors as well as 
in the Parliament and the Government (Vlk, 2006). The phenomenon found its 
proponents as well as opponents. Also a few independent observers, mainly from the area 
of higher education research, contributed to the debate. Furthermore, GATS was often 
mentioned in discussions and documents dedicated to the Open Bestel.  
 
The dynamic dimension (trickle-up trajectory), which as we mentioned involves 
stakeholders and their involvement in the discussion, was rich in the Dutch case. The 
Doha negotiation round drew noticeable attention from various stakeholders. GATS 
found both opponents and proponents in the Dutch context. Mainly the student unions 
(LSVb and ISO) advocated critical standpoints vis-à-vis the ‘commodification’ of higher 
education, GATS and the WTO itself. This position originated as a result of consultations 
with ESIB – the National Unions of Students in Europe. Also the Association of 
Universities of Professional Education (HBO-Raad) as well as the Association of 
Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) expressed their objections to GATS, yet the 
standpoint of the latter was less critical. On the other side, mainly the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was in favor of liberalization and privatization policy in higher 
education as much as in other sectors. The Confederation of Netherlands Industry and 
Employers (VNO-NCW) in general was in favor of liberalization in all sectors including 
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public services. Finally, the position of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
can be said to have oscillated between opposing and favoring liberalization and 
privatization, depending somewhat on the political and personal preferences of the 
ministers in charge. Intensive interaction took place among the stakeholders during which 
individual positions were explained and certain misunderstandings cleared up. In the end, 
despite continuingly diverging views on GATS and its potential consequences, the most 
important players supported the decision not to make further commitments in higher 
education.       
 
As stressed above, stakeholders’ involvement was fairly intensive in the Dutch context. 
Although it did not result in any significant direct changes in the steering capacity (e.g. 
legal regulation), its impact might be seen rather in an indirect way. Hence the argument 
is that it did affect the state’s decisions, albeit indirectly. The discussion on GATS and its 
potential consequences on higher education in the Netherlands influenced the debate on 
the Open System. It gave the government additional arguments to push for experiments, 
and at the same time put stakeholders (mainly the opponents) on the defence.  
 
Furthermore, the stakeholders’ interaction during the GATS discussion resulted in better 
understanding of each others’ positions and in the decision not to make further 
commitments at the moment. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the Dutch commitments 
would not have been extended anyway, even without any opposition from stakeholders, 
as they were already rather generous since the end of the Uruguay Round.  
 
Neither the commitments made in 1994 nor the renegotiation round made an impact on 
existing Dutch higher education legislation. The 1994 commitments only reflected the 
then existing access of foreign higher education providers to the Dutch market which was 
already possible according to the legislation. Higher education legislation was not 
modified subsequently because of GATS’ general disciplines or individual Dutch 
commitments. Despite some doubts related to the hybrid character of the system, i.e. 
higher education institutions may have private status and be at the same time publicly 
funded, the existing system did not seem to be in conflict with the GATS principles in 
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2005. Rather, the measures which are planned to be taken in the future in the direction of 
the Open System might have certain consequences if the GATS’ principles are applied. 
Therefore, principal GATS rules, such as the most favored nation status or the national 
treatment, should be carefully confronted with any future legislation changes or policy 
implementations, especially in the Netherlands where the boundaries between public and 
private higher education are already rather blurred.   
   
The relationship between the state and higher education institutions in the Netherlands 
seems to have been influenced more by other factors (i.e. the drive for more national 
competition in the higher education sector) than by GATS or the GATS renegotiation 
round, although the discussion on GATS contributed to the national debate on higher 
education. However, the belief of most actors we interviewed was that the policy change 
towards a more open market and increased competition in the field would certainly have 
taken place despite the GATS renegotiations. Ideas which were conceptualized 
afterwards in the Open System experiments, appeared already before the GATS 
discussion was launched in the Netherlands. The main policy drivers were concerns about 
the perceived lack of competition and lack of quality in the system, access, overall 
efficiency, consumer orientation, etc.  
 
In sum, it was more or less a coincidence that GATS was renegotiated at the same time 
when significant policy changes (Open System) in Dutch higher education were being 
considered for change. While liberalization was ‘in the air’, we could not find causal 
links between the two: the Open System discussion had started independently of the 
GATS discussion (and continued after GATS came to a temporary standstill).  However, 
once it had gained access to the agenda, the GATS topic was then used in the national 
discussion as a lever for change.            
 
Comparison of the Czech and Dutch Cases 
At the beginning of this comparative section, a few facts should be mentioned about 
higher education systems in both countries, mainly concerning the steering mechanisms 
and related issues. The Dutch system can described as a hybrid model showing many 
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characteristics of the corporate-pluralist steering model moving steadily towards a 
supermarket model due to increasing liberalization. The Czech Republic would best fit an 
institutional steering model, however, it too is a hybrid case and the intention of the state 
is to move it more towards a supermarket model.  
 
The instruments used to steer higher education were rather similar in both countries. In 
the Netherlands these included funding, quality assurance mechanisms (since 2003 in the 
form of accreditation), long-term planning through the quadrennial Higher Education and 
Research Plan and the minister’s authority to intervene if necessary with respect to study 
programs (limiting the establishment of new programs for reasons of macro-efficiency, 
and limiting access to study programs in exceptional circumstances through a numerus 
fixus or labor market fixus). The Czech state was limited in its steering capacity, 
according to its own statements, to funding (but that included access to all study 
programs, as the state funded a certain number of places for entrants per study program 
per year), and quality assurance in the form of accreditation and long-term planning.  
 
Governmental steering in Dutch higher education gradually moved from setting 
conditions to focusing on the performance of institutions and students. As a result, quality 
assurance was performed in an ex-post manner and the funding mechanism was mainly 
output oriented. In the Czech Republic, the system in 2000 rather prescribed the behavior 
of institutions. Quality assurance emphasized ex-ante control, and the funding mechanism 
was to a large extent input oriented. However, around the end of the period under study 
changes have been implemented towards a more output-oriented approach, with funding 
based on the number of bachelor program graduates. In this respect we can see the Czech 
system converge somewhat to the steering mode in the Netherlands. Yet, both systems 
remain hybrid, although moving at various paces and using various means in the direction 
of a supermarket model.   
 
An interesting difference between the two cases can be observed when it comes to 
stakeholders and their involvement in higher education policy-making. In Dutch higher 
education various stakeholders outside academia (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
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Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers, etc.) are actively involved. 
Important higher education topics usually are intensively discussed among all with an 
interest in higher education. Major issues are also debated in governmental advisory 
bodies, such as the Education Council, the Advisory Council for Science and 
Technology, and the Social-Economic Council. In the Czech Republic most interaction 
takes place between the Ministry of Education and the higher education institutions 
directly. The impact of employers, Ministry of Industry and Trade and other stakeholders 
on higher education policy is very limited, although the situation apparently started to 
change recently.         
 
The legal frameworks for higher education, applicable at the time when this study was 
conducted, were rather detailed in both analyzed countries. Czech legislation explicitly 
distinguished between public, state and private higher education institutions. Besides 
general rules, specific provisions of the Higher Education Act (111/1998) applied to each 
sub-sector. In general, the internal organization of public and state institutions and a 
number of formal procedures were prescribed in detail by the legislation. In the 
Netherlands, the Higher Education Act (WHW, 1993) was of a more general nature in 
some respects. It distinguished between public and private institutions next to 
‘recognized’ (private, non-government funded) higher education institutions. Institutional 
governance structures were prescribed for all government funded higher education 
institutions. 
 
Government funding was a crucial steering mechanism in both the Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic. Only institutions listed in the legislation were eligible for government 
funding. However, in the Czech Republic, a clear line was drawn between state and 
public institutions, on the one hand, and private providers on the other. The former were 
explicitly entitled to receive money from the state budget. The latter were not. Yet upon 
meeting certain criteria (namely being a public utility organization), they could also apply 
for a subsidy from the state budget. In the Netherlands, state funding was granted to both 
public and privately founded (mostly protestant/catholic church-related) higher education 
institutions. Recognized (i.e. private, non-government funded) higher education providers 
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had to rely on private financial sources. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of 
Czech and Dutch higher education as discussed.  
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Table 1 – Main characteristics of higher education in the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands 
 
 The Czech Republic The Netherlands  
Historical background First established in 1348 
Since 1948 till 1989 a part of 
the communist bloc  
After 1989 a sudden shift from 
a centralized system into an 
autonomous one  
First established in 1578 
HE developed as a typical 
Western European system in a 
democratic society 
Composition of HE 
(student enrolments) 
9% - professional education 
91% - academic education  
63% - professional education 
37% - academic education 
Public & private HE  
(student enrolments) 
93% - public (including state) 
7% - private  
88% - public  
12% - private (estimated) 
Government steering Corporate-pluralist steering 
model with some elements of 
the institutional state  
Corporate-pluralist steering 
model with a number of 
elements of a supermarket 
model 
Steering   mechanisms Quality assurance: ex ante 
accreditation  
Long-term plans of the Ministry 
State funding (mainly input 
based)  
Quality assurance: ex ante and 
ex-post accreditation  
HE and Research Plan (4 year 
cycle) 
State funding (mainly output 
based)  
Macro-efficiency (planning) 
Legal framework Distinguishes state, public and 
private higher education 
institutions 
 
Rather detailed provisions on 
internal organization of 
institutions.   
Distinguishes public and private 
(governmentally funded) vs. 
recognized private (non-
government funded) HE 
institutions. 
Governance structures are 
described in a rather general 
way for government-funded HE 
institutions. 
Governmental funding  Public and state institutions 
only, private upon meeting 
certain criteria 
For public and private 
(government funded) 
institutions  
Higher Education as a 
market  
Unmet demand for HE 
Public institutions charge no 
tuition fees 
No targeted effort on either 
export or import of HE 
Supply and demand match 
Tuition fees for both public and 
private institutions  
Increasing focus on HE export  
The Open Bestel experiments  
Stakeholders  Involvement of other 
stakeholders in HE policy-
making is rather limited 
Broader range of stakeholders 
actively involved in HE policy-
making 
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With respect to the main issue of our article—the impact of GATS on the steering 
capacity of a nation state—de iure impact was not found in either case study, neither 
through legal provisions (static dimension/trickle down) nor through stakeholders’ 
involvement (dynamic dimension/trickle up). Neither the regulation of higher education 
(through the legal framework) nor the steering model changed as a result of GATS’ 
national commitments or its general disciplines and rules.  
 
In more detail, with respect to the formal legal setting, i.e. the trickle-down trajectory, no 
impact of GATS could be traced in either case study. No changes initiated by GATS’ 
commitments or general disciplines had to be made in the national legislation that would 
influence the steering capacity of the nation state. Neither were there any request and 
offer processes in the wake of GATS. In short: the conditions in 2004 remained in that 
respect the same as in 1994. In both countries, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, 
GATS so far has not meant a concrete or direct challenge to the steering capacity of the 
nation state under existing conditions.  
 
The direct impact of stakeholders, i.e. the trickle-up trajectory, was not significant either 
in both countries, despite very different dynamics. In the Czech Republic no strong 
stakeholder involvement was found with respect to GATS; stakeholders neither supported 
nor opposed the Agreement. The national schedule of commitments was only very 
slightly modified by the Ministry of Education, without much public discussion. In the 
Netherlands, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the discussion on GATS was quite 
intensive. Standpoints varied across the stakeholders: some opposed GATS very strongly 
(for example students), others emphasized the potential positive effects of GATS on 
higher education. We observed that GATS served as a lever for change in the Dutch 
environment (i.e. as an argument for launching Open System experiments), which also 
means that the intense discussion did not lead to reversing the policy at the time. 
However, the main rationales behind changes in higher education in the Netherlands were 
not inspired by GATS per se. More significant was mainly the general tendency of the 
Dutch government to deliberately introduce less regulation and more competition into the 
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public sector including higher education.  
 
Conclusions Concerning the State’s Steering Capacity 
Based on the literature analyzed and the two case studies conducted, in Figure 2 we 
model the position of two contemporary European states together with various actors and 
factors that in mutual interaction influence (to different extents) the steering capacity of a 
nation state. As it is impossible to capture the whole, immensely complex environment, 
the figure includes only the most important elements. The central object, the steering 
capacity of a nation state in higher education, is positioned in the middle of the figure. 
This steering capacity is usually most directly influenced by the ministry responsible for 
higher education though under privatization and liberalization processes, steering has 
often been influenced by other actors on the national level including the economics and 
finance ministries.  
 
The state’s steering capacity of higher education is exposed to two directions of pressure. 
The upper cluster in our figure represents the pressure for change in public services in 
general. It is associated with liberalization, privatization and introduction of markets to 
the public sector. The focus is mainly on efficiency, competition and consumer-oriented 
behavior of providers. The underlying assumption is that more competition on the market 
leads to better quality of provided services, higher responsiveness and thus to greater 
consumer satisfaction. The focus on consumer satisfaction means that consumers should 
have the main say (as consumers themselves know what best satisfies them). In other 
words, higher education should be demand-driven. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) constitutes the most important institutional player in this cluster on the global 
level. The European Commission is a significant regional player advocating open markets 
and increasing competition. On the national level, the above-mentioned principles are 
most often advocated by the ministries of finance, economic affairs, or trade and industry 
(in the Netherlands also to some extent by the Ministry of Education); they are reflected 
in national liberalization, deregulation and privatization policies. Economists, industry, 
businesses and for-profit providers as a rule support this perspective.      
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Figure 2: Factors and actors influencing the steering capacity in higher education  
 
The lower cluster is associated with the traditional higher education system; it attempts to 
maintain the existing framework and resist the changes advocated by the upper cluster. It 
stresses the cultural, social and public missions of education. The historical contribution 
of a traditional higher education system to national development efforts is highlighted. 
Public provision of higher education is regarded as guaranteeing higher quality than 
private provision. The focus is on access, equity, cooperation and networks. Excellence 
and quality are the desired key values of the system. Higher education is mainly supply 
driven and oriented towards providers. This perspective of higher education is mostly 
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shared by traditional public universities, academics, students (mainly at public 
universities) and labor unions.    
 
In our figure, the European Commission is positioned above the national level, 
representing pressure for more competition and more open markets. However, with 
respect to GATS and higher education, the position of the European Commission vis-à-
vis member states is not clearly supra-nationally ‘above’ them as certain competences are 
shared. According to the European Court’s opinion from 1994 the Community and its 
Member States are jointly competent to conclude GATS. Moreover, the European 
Commission is not a homogenous body. For example, the European Commission is a key 
player in important developments influencing higher education systems such as the 
Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy. Interestingly, the Bologna process can be 
positioned closer to the ‘traditional’ cluster as it highlights cooperation among 
participating (public) parties. The Lisbon strategy, on the other hand, is much more 
focused on competition and economic growth, and therefore can be placed closer to the 
upper cluster. Yet these two strategies seem to become more and more integrated as far as 
the EC’s policy is concerned. Another lack of homogeneity in the EC concerns the 
distance that often exists between its roles in trade and in education.  
 
However, in the Czech case study the role of the European Commission and its 
liberalization policies was rather insignificant when it came to higher education. In 
contrast, the Bologna process and accompanying measures were given considerable 
attention by both the Ministry and higher education institutions. On the Dutch side, the 
relationship between the national and European policy levels was more complicated, but 
in summary the situation was rather that the Dutch government in the period studied was 
more liberalization-minded than most other EU countries, so that the final EU position’s 
(a comprise) role in the national policy debate on GATS was not very strong there, either.   
 
Conclusions  
Based on Castells (2002) and our figure 2 we can claim that higher education nowadays 
consists of complex networks embracing an increasing range of stakeholders at local, 
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regional, national and global levels. Policy-making, decision-making, policy-
implementation and evaluation in higher education are influenced by interconnected 
developments often initiated across national and sectoral borders (Van der Wende, 2002). 
Increasing numbers of stakeholders and developments come from outside academia and 
outside the education sector. As a result, the steering capacity of a nation state in higher 
education has become more complex to exercise. Increasing complexity, global trends 
and the growing variety of stakeholders involved on all levels (supranational 
organizations such as the EU, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as 
well as student unions, labor unions, etc.) have made the ability of the nation state to steer 
the higher education system less obvious, without necessarily taking options for the 
nation state away completely.  
 
Besides, global and national levels in higher education are increasingly interconnected 
and influence each other through multinational agreements in more general fields like 
trade in services. If a particular national decision is made or a national policy is applied 
on the national level, it might have significant consequences when it comes to 
international obligations. For example, subsidizing selected foreign providers might 
eventually open the door for others to claim the most-favored-nation principle under the 
WTO framework. In other words, although the nation state still regulates and steers its 
national higher education system, its decisions might be confronted with its international 
obligations and consequences in unexpected ways.   
 
The pressure for change in higher education (steering) in many cases comes from a 
national tendency to introduce market-like mechanism, intensive competition, further 
liberalization, etc. This can be considered as a deliberate and intentional choice by the 
nation state to limit its steering capacity, replacing it partly by market-type steering 
mechanisms. At the same time, the process of European integration is another important 
development, influencing higher education policies and the steering capacity of a nation 
state in higher education. Furthermore, the steering capacity is also increasingly being 
shaped by other inter-governmental institutions such as UNESCO, the WTO, the World 
Bank or OECD. Therefore, we claim that the steering capacity of a nation state in higher 
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education has become more complex to exercise, or as we called it above, the ability of 
the nation state to steer the higher education system has become less obvious.    
 
Finally, we can address the general expectation among stakeholders, mainly the critics, 
that the steering capacity of a nation state in higher education has been weakened due to 
GATS. The findings of the two conducted case studies reported here do not support a 
strong version of this assumption. Despite the increasingly complicated environment 
described in the previous paragraphs, our in-depth case studies rather support the claim 
that it is still the nation state, either by its domestic policies or partly by its participation 
in international agreements (such as GATS) or supranational structures (such as the EU), 
which ultimately decides how the national higher education systems will function. The 
choice to deregulate and liberalize the higher education market is a deliberate choice of a 
national government which by doing so may intentionally reduce its steering capacity. 
The nation state as the most important player still constitutes and shapes its steering 
capacity in higher education, although it seems that, because of increasing 
interconnectedness of various policy levels, the steering capacity has become 
increasingly complex and less obvious to exercise than before. International treaties and 
organizations such as GATS and the WTO imply additional consequences to policy 
choices which may be hard to predict for policy-makers at the national level. What has 
decreased, therefore, is not so much the steering capacity of the nation state, but rather 
the certainty about effects of policy-choices (although there never may have been much 
certainty about consequences of choices in our complex societies).  
 
 
Postscript on the WTO Doha Round 
Much has changed since the start of our study in 2002. The greatly heated debates on 
GATS and higher education that characterized the first years of the Doha Round, and that 
were an important object of analysis in this study, have given way to (at least temporary) 
silence, following the decision of the WTO (27 July 2006) to suspend this so far 
unsuccessful round of trade negotiations. However, after Hong Kong, some movement 
towards benchmarking could be seen (Oxfam, 2005). Apart from the political naming and 
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shaming, and as efforts to re-launch the round may be in preparation, it is too early to say 
how disappointment and the (dis)ability to claim victory are exactly spread across 
proponents and opponents. The more so as the UN’s millennium goals for development 
that this trade negotiation round promised to support seem even harder to achieve without 
agreements on free trade at all. This unsuccessful result coincides in time with more 
difficulty in general to make progress at the global and multilateral level; multilateralism 
generally is under pressure. Bilateral and regional agreements may gain popularity as 
alternatives. Therefore we cannot predict what the role of international organizations and 
multi-lateral agreements will be in the next phase of globalization. Nevertheless, it has 
been most valuable to conduct this early research into the possible interference between 
global, regional and national regulatory frameworks, as a first step to gain insight into the 
complex area of global public governance, which in our view will become more relevant 
for higher education in any case.  
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